Diepe analyse


Benjamin Berman et al

"The majority of all aviation accidents are attributed primarily to human error, but this is often misinterpreted as evidence of lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness of the pilots." (back cover)

"The book examines the ways in which competing task demands, ambiguity and organizational pressures interact with cognitive processes to make all experts vulnerable to characteristic forms of error." (back cover)

"Although The Limits of Expertise is directed to aviation operations, the implications are clear for understanding the decision processes, skilled performance and errors of professionals in many domains, including medicine." (back cover)


Christopher Chabris / Daniel Simons

"The structure of the human body doesn’t permit us to fly, just as the structure of the mind doesn’t permit us to consciously perceive everything around us." (p. 39)

"This is the illusion of memory at work: most people firmly believe that they will notice unexpected changes, when in fact almost nobody does." (p. 55)

"In other experiments, Kruger and Dunning showed that this unskilled-and-unaware effect can be measured in many areas besides humor, including logical reasoning and English grammar skills. It probably applies to any area of human experience." (p. 89)

"We tend to think that our good performances reflect our superior abilities, while our mistakes are “accidental,” “inadvertent,” or a result of circumstances beyond our control, and we do our best to ignore evidence that contradicts these conclusions." (p. 90)

"Almost every report claiming to identify the key factors that lead companies to succeed (…) errs by considering onIy companies that succeeded and then analyzing what they did. They don’t look at whether other companies did those same things and failed." (p. 171)

"You’ll recognize that the confidence people express often reflects their personalities rather than their knowledge, memory, or ability." (p.241)

"(…) and new ways of understanding why people act the way they do. Often, it’s not because of stupidity, arrogance, ignorance, or lack of focus. It’s because of the everyday illusions that affect us all. Our final hope is that you will always consider this possibility before you jump to a harsher conclusion." (p. 242)


Sidney Dekker

"When faced with a human error problem, you may be tempted to ask 'Why didn't they watch out better? How could they not have noticed?'. You think you can solve your human error problem by telling people to be more careful, by reprimanding the miscreants, by issuing a new rule or procedure." (back cover)

"The new view recognizes that systems are inherent trade-offs between safety and other pressures (for example: production)." (back cover)

"It explains how to avoid the hindsight bias, to zoom out from the people closest in time and place to the mishap, and resist the temptation of counterfactual reasoning and judgmental language." (back cover)